- UPDATE: A subsequent investigation by the University of California Center for Laboratory Safety determined that the cause of the explosion was an electrostatic spark, after laboratory testing ruled out a spark from the pressure gauge. Read the full story here.
Web Date: April 19, 2016
Spark from pressure gauge caused University of Hawaii explosion, fire department says

An explosion last month that caused a University of Hawaii, Manoa, postdoctoral researcher to lose an arm was caused by a spark from a digital pressure gauge that was not designed for use with flammable gases, says a Honolulu Fire Department investigation report.
Thea Ekins-Coward was combining hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and oxygen gases from high-pressure cylinders into a lower pressure tank when the incident occurred. She has not given the university permission to release information about her condition, said spokesman Daniel Meisenzahl at an April 18 press conference.
The gas mixture was “food” for bacteria being used to produce biofuels and bioplastics. Ekins-Coward was working for the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute under researcher Jian Yu. A 2013 paper by Yu indicates a set-up in which gases are plumbed through a mixing device called a gas proportioner directly into the bioreactor (Int. J. Hydrogen Energy 2013, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijhydene.2013.04.153). The gas gauge identified in the paper is an “intrinsically safe” model designed to prevent ignition.
But after Ekins-Coward started in the lab last fall, she purchased a 49-L steel gas tank, a different gauge not rated as intrinsically safe, a pressure-relief valve, and fittings, and she put them together, Yu and Ekins-Coward told fire department investigators, according to the report. Ekins-Coward would add the gases to the portable tank, which would then be connected to the bioreactor. She was using a mixture of 70% hydrogen, 25% oxygen, and 5% carbon dioxide for her experiments, the report says.
In the week before the incident, a similar set-up with a 3.8-L tank resulted in a “small internal explosion” when Ekins-Coward pressed the off button on the gauge, the fire department report says. She also occasionally experienced static shocks when touching the tank, which was not grounded. She reported the shocks and possibly the small explosion to Yu, who told her not to worry about it, the report says.
On the day of the incident, the 49-L tank exploded when Ekins-Coward pressed the off button on the gauge. “She did not lose consciousness or hit her head; she was aware that she lost her arm in the explosion,” the report says. “She couldn’t open the door to the lab, the door was stuck closed.” Security officers and a graduate student kicked in the door to help Ekins-Coward get out. Her right arm was severed just above the elbow, the report says.
The University of Hawaii hired the University of California Center for Laboratory Safety to independently investigate the incident. That report is expected to be completed by the end of this month. The Hawaii Occupational Safety & Health Division is also investigating the incident.
Disaster Scene
These photos, released by the Honolulu Fire Department,
llustrate the force of the March 16 explosion and its consequences.
(warning: some images are graphic)













- Chemical & Engineering News
- ISSN 0009-2347
- Copyright © American Chemical Society
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
As Robert H notes, I was not there, and don't know the particulars, but on reading what is reported here I'm very surprised by the use of the mixture, and would be concerned if the workers had not considered this to be highly hazardous from the start.
Leave A Comment
I hope pray this researcher has a full recover although She lost an arm and will never fully recover... this is too high of a price to pay!... the research community must take steps to prevent such an accident from occurring in the future.
If any one has ideas for action and lesion learned documentation dissemination I raze my hand to assist.
Mark Bricka
Chemical-Environmental Engineer
Mississippi State U.
Leave A Comment
It is frustrating that it is such a stark contrast with industry, where even something as seemingly minor as the potential of a pinched finger in a cabinet requires a report and corrective action implementation. In comparing industry and academia on safety standards, it seems that at heart, academia should be MORE strict with safety, not less. In an industry lab, many of the risks are well known, whereas in academic research, one is often pushing the boundaries of current knowledge, meaning that all of the risks are not well known or understood. This should make us MORE vigilant rather than less vigilant. What needs to be done to make a change? It seems that our collective sadness over these stories isn't encouraging change. Do we need to restrict funding until appropriate safety measures are implemented? Do we need to resort to punitive measures?
I am thankful that this accident did not result in loss of life. I wish Dr. Ekins-Coward all the best in her recovery, both physically and mentally.
Leave A Comment
* methanol, http://cen.acs.org/articles/93/i46/Make-Chemistry-Classroom-Demonstrations-Experiments.html
* tert-butyllithium, http://cen.acs.org/articles/87/i31/Learning-UCLA.html
Or explosions from:
* hydrogen + oxygen, this story
* nitric acid + organics, http://cenblog.org/the-safety-zone/tag/nitricacid/
* nickel hydrazine perchlorate, http://cen.acs.org/articles/88/i34/Texas-Tech-Lessons.html
* azide, http://cenblog.org/the-safety-zone/2014/07/more-details-on-the-university-of-minnesota-explosion-and-response/
* diazonium perchlorate, http://cen.acs.org/articles/93/i33/CEN-Talks-Safety-UC-Berkeleys.html
Or a death from toxic:
* dimehtylmercury, http://stemed.unm.edu/pdfs/cd/classroom_lab_safety/trembling_edge_science.pdf
The chemicals involved behaved exactly as expected.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
What then is the solution to these types of accidents? I always find that punitive measures, while effective to some degree, fail to get the appropriate buy-in from people. We shouldn't care about safety because we are concerned over the litigious outcomes; we should care about safety because we care about our well-being and that of our coworkers.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
For anyone handling dimethylmercury, this is information from a safety letter that ran in C&EN on May 12, 1997:
A highly resistant laminate glove (SilverShield or 4H) should be worn under a pair of long-cuffed, unsupported neoprene, nitrite, or similar heavy-duty gloves. Latex or PVC gloves have an important role in many
laboratory activities, but they are not suitable for significant, direct contact with aggressive or highly toxic chemicals. Medical surveillance measuring mercury concentrations in whole blood or urine should be considered for repeated or extended use of alkyl mercury compounds. In all cases, the potential hazards associated with dimethylmercury and related alkyl mercury compounds must not be underestimated.
http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/cen-v075n019.p007
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
The point being that any explosion protected equipment, including Intrinsically safe apparatus would need to have been specifically approved for an oxygen enriched atmosphere. The spark ignition properties are some X10 to x20 more onerous in enriched atmospheres. NFPA 53 gives some guidance as to the risks. Managing pure oxygen or oxygen at pressure also imposes its own ignition risks without need of any spark assistance from non-explosion protected equipment.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
The APLU Lab Safety Task Force guidance document just released
http://www.aplu.org/library/safety-culture/file
and it includes, demurely, as part of point 4: "Establish recognition and reward systems and integrate these into tenure and promotion, hiring, and annual performance reviews."
Until this happens, and faculty hiring and promotion are tied to their responsibility for safety, not much is going to change. And that is a *very* scary step in this day when so much money is tied to getting "good" faculty, and "good" does not seem to have a safety component. "Good" equals number of papers, number of dollars. Maybe much easier after all of the grant and contract-awarding sources are required to tie the grants and contracts to a PI's safety performance. Maybe Journals will require a safety certification before accepting manuscripts.....
Leave A Comment
As mentioned by many others, with all these very preventable accidents and tragedies in mind, what will it take to alter the academic safety culture? I am without clue on this.
Leave A Comment
Regardless of why the student failed to exactly follow the original paper, this incident CLEARLY points out the typical lack of concern in educational facilities about safety--UNTIL a catastrophe occurs! Personally, I am grateful to have worked for a few years in an excellent industrial research facility before doing my thesis research. There were no exceptions to rigorous safety procedures, and all technologists had to rotate through safety inspection teams that checked all labs monthly.
Safety-wise, my grad school experience was a shock many decades ago, and it seems little has changed since. I cannot claim to be the most safety-conscious chemist in history, but even a tiny quantity of O2-H2 mixture in a pressure vessel would make me nervous. The original experiment used a gallon. It got scaled up to 13. That's a car gas tank full. Of a gas mixture with the highest energy and widest explosive range of all. OMG!
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Unfortunately in our university we don't care much about safety and security of labs and lab working, and I'm terrified of some views of dangerous or hazardous situations. In my country... unless an accident happened... no one care about safety , after disaster.... cautions will be taken but in wrong manner. If I present some photos of our labs to you .... you never believe. But fortunately.... no serious accidents happened till now.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
It would have been a large improvement to mix these gases right at the bioreactor but even then the mixture is explosive, but in a smaller vessel most likely with a lower pressure rating an explosion would have caused much less damage and she might still have her arm. She was fortunate not to be killed!
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
As sad as it is she lost her arm, the most important take-away of this is to Check, Check, and Check again, make SURE everything is correct and right, if you have the wrong equipment DO NOT GO BLINDLY into your experiment but wait until you get the correct equipment, and even IF a senior research fellow says "It's OK, go ahead", if something like that happens, STOP until you fix the problem.
Thea bears the responsibility that she didn't stop what she was doing and correct the KNOWN problem before stepping up the experiment, and Wu bears the responsibility of encouraging a student to go ahead with an experiment that had blown up once, and instead of shutting it down he encouraged her to increase the experiment using larger quantities of the highly flammable mixture with the wrong equipment.
I only hope other Graduate (and undergraduate) students - and especially their faculty and advisors - remember that NOTHING trumps safety. Nothing. Ever.
Leave A Comment
Did he really tell her "not to worry about" the previous warning signs? I want to say "that's unthinkable," but, well, it's a little too easy to believe.
Leave A Comment
I ALWAYS assumed my reagents/mixtures/solutions would catch on fire, treated them accordingly.Should be standard assumption.
Leave A Comment
But keep feeding them grants, cheap science all the way.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
One can only theorize about the underlying causes that led to the incident - the pressure on the post-doc to conduct research, the general lack of safety culture in many academic labs and the indifference of PIs to maintaining safety standards.
When I hear news like this, I realize how lucky I am to work in industrial R&D. Yes, incidents happen in chemical industry as well. But overall, I feel much more empowered to make my labs safer for my technicians and myself compared with my time in academia.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
http://cenblog.org/the-safety-zone/2016/07/gas-cylinder-storage-at-the-university-of-hawaii/
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
What I also find interesting is that the fire fighters aren’t even using their respirators, exposing their gear and lungs to bacteria and who knows what harmful chemicals are in there also. The blood alone would make me use a disposable suit.
Leave A Comment
The response narratives start on page 39:
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2805224-2016-05-30-Honolulu-Fire-Department-Report-on.html
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Since it was a pressurized system containing an explosive hydrogen gas mixture, I suspect that at minimum, there would be an emphasis on a design that minimized risk including volume limits, an inspection for electrical safety, and likely, some sort of containment system would be incorporated to protect against just this sort of catastrophe. A reviewer would probably ask "is there a safer way to introduce the gas mixture into the reactor?".
These sorts of intensive safety programs add time and cost to the business of doing science (but are ubiquitous in industry and government labs), but the flip side is what we see in these pictures: when things go wrong, they go very, very wrong.
My heart goes out to Thea, and I hope the University of Hawaii and other research campuses take the institutional steps to make sure this scenario never plays out again.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Nothing shows whether or how the oxygen cylinders were secured.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
In any case, a bit of blood might just wake a few people up. It took the death of Sheri Sangji to change the culture at UCLA.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2805224-2016-05-30-Honolulu-Fire-Department-Report-on.htm
Leave A Comment
There is more back story about tragic accidents from pressurizing mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen here:
http://www.dailynews.com/article/ZZ/20120209/NEWS/120209621
Death and dismemberment have occurred on at least two other occasions in recent years. Further, CalOSHA was slow to originally act on the intrinsically hazardous nature of this process. Purported existence of an "energized form of water" rather than an exceedingly dangerous mixture of hydrogen and oxygen apparently stumped CalOSHA investigators.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
The story warns of "graphic images" but those images should be reviewed by anyone with keys to a lab, and by those planning on continuing a series of experiments already proven to be dangerous... so the researcher realizes that the cost of dropping safety protocols may be higher than one would think.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
In my opinion, both the researcher and professor, and the manufacturers of the electronic pressure gauge are 50:50 to blame for the accident. This is because the PG researcher and professor failed to consider in the safety of usage of highly flammable gases and the explosion from the previous experimentation. The manufacturers are also to blame for failing to manufacture a safe enough instrument to use under flammable gas conditions- manufacturers failed to manufacture an electronic pressure gauge where the circuit board and switch component of the gauge was not sealed tightly so no gases can enter the circuit board and switch component. Both the researcher and her tutor, and the manufacture need to make changes in safety- for the manufacture, they should manufacture instruments that are design safe for gaseous experiments.
Leave A Comment
We do not know if the gauge was even rated for the use they put it!
My bet (based on the cavalierly manners described) is that they just grabbed the first automatic gauge they could get their hands on and my guess is that it was not (by the manufacturer) rated for flammable/explosive gas mixtures (ATEX approved for us here in the EU).
Also based on the setup described, even had they used ATEX equipment, an explosion could occur anyways as gas flowing through pipes can create enough static electricity to cause sparks......
The golden rule about such things is to keep the volume of explosive mixture as small as ever possible, and in their case that would require 3 independent regulators/valves, one for each pure gas individually, and then only mixing the gasses in the small chamber with the bacteria.....
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
I am saying this as I transitioned from academia to industry and deal with scale-up and calorimetry on daily basis.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Most universities have access to specialists for the design and testing of specialized apparatus. Why wasn't this done? In my judgment, any apparatus designed to manipulate pressurized, flammable gases should be built, tested, and certified by such specialists.
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment
Story and links to the report are here: http://cen.acs.org/articles/94/i28/University-Hawaii-lab-explosion-likely.html
Leave A Comment
Gas cylinder storage at the University of Hawaii
Leave A Comment
Leave A Comment