Securing Chemical Facilities

ACS MEETING NEWS

In the post-9/11 world, a week hardly passes without mention of the vulnerability of chemical plants to terrorist attacks. So the one-day symposium on the future of chemical plant security was an apt presidential event at the American Chemical Society national meeting in Washington, D.C., last month.

The symposium was one of 10 such events that ACS President William F. Carroll organized to explore the future of different sectors of the chemical enterprise 10 years out. As Carroll told attendees at the plant security symposium, "With a vision of the future, practitioners of chemistry can anticipate opportunity and benefit from it."

Carroll, a vice president at Occidental Chemical, said that, for the chemical industry, the four years since the 2001 terror attacks have "been an object lesson in rethought, reengineering, and redesign." He was the first of several speakers from industry who stressed the "thousands of hours and over $2 billion" that industry has "invested in making our processes less vulnerable" to terrorism.

Industry is not the only sector with vulnerable facilities, Carroll pointed out. High school, college, and university laboratories also need to address the same security concerns.

But for the most part, academia is not yet acknowledging, let alone addressing, security issues, said Steven G. Oberg, director of environmental health and safety at the University of Nevada, Reno. When Oberg conducted what he called "a coffee-break survey" of chemistry and chemical engineering faculty about the need to teach chemical process security, he got responses ranging from "It ain't my job" to "Are grants available for this?"

As Oberg pointed out, the academic community "discounts the risks," arguing that university labs deal in small quantities and that the risks are therefore low. But, Oberg said, that is clearly false, "and the realization is sinking in."

The problem is in part a cultural one. Many academic scientists, who "take their signals from leadership," have not differentiated lab security from lab safety. In fact, Oberg said, "neither safety nor security is considered a priority activity in the research/academic experience," and university officials have "been slow to react, even to targeted regulatory enforcement programs."

A partial explanation is the community's reigning mantra of academic freedom, which "is often defensively cited when external observers suggest that greater accountability is warranted," Oberg said. He added that providing "safety and security context in all [academic] courses is professional and social accountability."

The better path for higher education to take, Oberg said, is to "frame safety, security, and sustainability perspectives in every course as a means to bridge the academic/industry cultural divide." This, he said, would "prepare new graduates for any segment of the workforce," including industry.

OBERG CONTRASTED academia's more free-spirit culture with the vastly different one in industry. The highly regulated chemical industry--with its bottom-line focus, structured work environment, and centralized management--has initiated some voluntary security measures at chemical plants.

Although some security experts and environmental activists have argued that these voluntary measures are insufficient in light of the potential threat, industry points to its expenditures to date. As Gregory L. Keeports, director of Rohm and Haas's risk management services noted, the more than $2 billion that American Chemistry Council (ACC) members have invested "in added security does not include additional operating expenses for an increased security presence."

Although academia shuns regulation, industry is calling for federal legislation in the security arena. The first slide in Dorothy Kellogg's presentation read in large type: "ACC supports federal chemical security legislation." Kellogg is senior ACC director for security and operations.

Keeports said appropriate legislation is needed, but it has to be "pragmatic legislation." Such a law would "enhance joint industry and law enforcement efforts and improve community and industry emergency response capability," he said.

He warned, however, "We won't turn chemical plants into armed fortresses." Although inherent risk can be reduced "to some degree, we can't eliminate all risk," he cautioned. "Existing infrastructure and operations are not easily changed."

Although inherently safer technology "is mentioned as one solution," Keeports noted that "many challenges and barriers exist to applying" such technology. And, he stressed, "inherently safer is a philosophy, not a science or technology, and each situation has to be evaluated on its own merit. There are always trade-offs in risks and hazards." Furthermore, he said, "total safety is the deciding factor," and an inherently safer option may not provide the optimum total safety.

Keeports predicted that over the next 10 years, the "gradual move to inherently safer options will continue." He added, "Industry will continue its movement toward inherently safer processing where it makes good business sense." He also stressed that there will no dramatic changes.

He expects that federal security legislation likely will be passed that focuses "on pragmatic requirements." But that is only if there is not another major terrorist attack. If one does occur, Keeports said, "Congress will act quickly, and I can't bet on what that legislation" might look like.

Whereas academia shuns regulation, industry is calling for federal legislation in the security arena.

ON THE ISSUE of inherently safer chemical processes, Scott A. Berger, director of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' Center for Chemical Process Safety, cautioned that such processes "can help in [minimizing] toxic releases," but they "can't stop a plant from being a target" of terrorism. Still, he said, inherently safer options are an "essential part of continual improvements in process safety."

In summary, Berger said, inherently safer options "can be a process safety solution," although they are "less likely to be a security solution." In specific instances, inherently safer "should be pursued." One candidate, he cited, is "disinfection of drinking water using chlorine."

Kellogg stressed ACC's multifaceted "partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)." But she said more must to be done to make the industry more secure before 2015. Industry, she said, needs to improve background checks on employees and access control of its facilities as well as "cyber-physical security integration and better coordination with the public sector."

But at the top of her to-do list was Congress' need "to pass federal security legislation." Such legislation, Kellogg said, should "give DHS the authority to compel security at critical chemical assets and give industry credit for previous [security] investments." She said that "the Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 is a good model."

William R. Koch, global director for process safety at Air Products & Chemicals, underscored Kellogg's call for federal legislation. In fact, Koch envisioned such a law being enacted "within six to 12 months and modeled after ACC's Responsible Care Security Code and the MTSA."

Such a law should require, Koch said, "DHS compliance audits, background screening of all employees and contractors, identification of security-sensitive positions, mandatory training, and drills and reporting of incidents." He believes that so-called third-party warehouses as well as industry's customers also should have to comply with enacted chemical security legislation.

Koch also said that, in the future, new plants would likely be sited "in chemical manufacturing zones," as is now seen in Europe, and would "be located to minimize transportation of hazardous materials." These new plants would also have to complete a security vulnerability assessment during the plant design that would "address cyber and physical risks, and minimize off-site consequences and thefts." These plants would also better interact with local communities and emergency responders, he said.

Dana A. Shea, a research analyst with the Congressional Research Service, outlined Congress' struggles with crafting chemical plant security legislation, including such basics as defining what constitutes a chemical facility and what the federal security role is. Shea pointed out that DHS "says the federal role is to protect against catastrophic terrorism." Legislators, he said, "will have to balance what constitutes catastrophe against the number of facilities affected."

Shea told attendees that "DHS has recommended performance-based standards that recognize different levels of risks" with flexible means of compliance. The department would also "recognize voluntary efforts already under way." These conditions are part of MTSA and are endorsed by industry.

In Congress, two security bills have been introduced in the House--H.R. 1562 by Rep. Vito J. Fossella (R-N.Y.) and H.R. 2237 by Rep. Frank Pallone Jr. (D-N.J.)--and they differ substantially. No security measures have been introduced in the Senate, Shea said.

Fossella's bill sets up a new security program within DHS, which would designate the chemical facilities covered. Facilities covered under MTSA, however, would be exempt from the provisions of the new security law. Those facilities covered by the legislation would have to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop site security plans, among other requirements. Civil penalties are set for noncompliance.

Pallone's bill establishes the new security program within the Environmental Protection Agency. No chemical facility would be exempt from the security law, even if it is covered by other laws. And the bill provides for civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.

Fossella's bill doesn't discuss inherently safer technologies, while Pallone's bill does.

Most of the symposium speakers represented the industry's point of view. There were no speakers from the environmental community and no terrorism experts. Neal Langerman, a coorganizer of the symposium and principal scientist at the consulting firm Advanced Chemical Safety, said he made "a conscious decision to go in the direction of engineering, education, and legislation to address the issues of security." His thinking, he told C&EN, is that "if we improve our security and reduce the potential for any kind of release, we protect the environment."