As the world evaluates the future of nuclear energy, the industry evolves its messaging

“Death Rays: The History of Nuclear Fear” and “(Over) Selling Nuclear Energy” were two of the talks in the opening session of a workshop organized by the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The workshop, held Sept. 1–3, surveyed the challenges facing nuclear power in the US. Information discussed at the workshop will inform a consensus study the academies are working on titled “Laying the Foundation for New and Advanced Nuclear Reactors in the United States.”

It was very interesting to hear about the nuclear industry’s record of public engagement, which was reviewed by Thomas R. Wellock from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an independent agency tasked with regulating “the safe use of radioactive materials . . . while protecting people and the environment.”

Wellock spoke of three eras since the mid-1950s characterized by assumptions around public trust in nuclear power.

The first era, which Wellock named Trust the Experts, covered the 1955–71 period. During this time, the nuclear industry operated on the assumption that the public trusted experts and was willing to be educated by them. The nuclear industry and organizations that foster the development and use of atomic science and technologies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), were highly respected in the early part of this era.

But as time progressed, some began to question the reliability of existing knowledge. In particular, during the late 1960s, as the industry attempted to scale up nuclear plants, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards concluded that nuclear plants had enough energy to cause a power excursion that would lead to a core meltdown during an accident, potentially breaking through the containment structure and exposing the area to radiation.

The AEC had previously promoted containment domes as a safety feature, arguing that “with containment, the consequences of a major accident were zero,” Wellock explained. The advisory committee’s review revealed that “a severe accident was possible, but the probability of it happening was so small that reactors should still be regarded as safe,” Wellock said. “Reactor safety became probabilistic, not deterministic.”

The nuclear industry concluded that the problem was one of messaging and that the public would trust “more objectively stated proofs of safety.” This belief signals the beginning of a second era—Trust the Numbers—which would last until 1980. Its assumption was that quantitatively expressed measures of risk would allow the public to compare nuclear power and its relative hazards with those of other kinds of technological advances that the public relied on, such as airplane travel.

“Experts had created a generation of nuclear hypochondriacs,” Wellock said. But they soon found that the public was not typically persuaded by numbers alone. Hearings and engagement opportunities “did not go very well.” Experts found that low-probability, high-consequence events were an extremely difficult concept for the public to grasp.

Enter the third area, Earning Trust (1980–present), when the industry moved from proactive public campaigns and education efforts into more modest attempts to regain trust. The emphasis in messaging shifted toward demonstrating competence through good regulatory principles and high levels of operational performance, efficiency, and safety. As governments and agencies around the world evaluate the future of nuclear energy, the industry will need to continue to evolve its messaging to win back trust. Demonstrating competence, showing a long history of safe operation, and engaging with openness, clarity, and reliability will be key components of that messaging if the industry hopes to be trusted with the world’s energy future.

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